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In pay-TV, conditional access systems (CAS) are used by a rights issuer to guarantee 
that only authorized subscribers gain access to TV channels. A CAS scheme that applies 
attribute-based access control through attribute-based encryption (ABE) with revocation 
was proposed by Yeh and Huang (2013) [1]. Yeh and Huang extend an existing ABE scheme 
with a revocation mechanism. We show that the CAS by Yeh and Huang has security and 
eﬃciency problems. Particularly, we show that the revocation mechanism proposed by Yeh 
and Huang is vulnerable to collusion attacks.
© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The CAS by Yeh and Huang [1] is based on the key-
policy ABE scheme (KPABE) in [2]. Yeh and Huang extend 
this scheme with a revocation mechanism. In Section 2, we 
recall KPABE. In Section 3, we recall the CAS in [1]. We dis-
cuss its eﬃciency and security problems in Section 4.
2. Technical background
We refer to [2] for a description of bilinear maps and 
of access structures and access trees.
Key-policy attribute-based encryption. Let S be the set of all 
attributes. Let Q be the set of all access structures that are 
allowed over S. We denote by A  P the fact that a set of 
attributes A satisﬁes the access structure P. A key-policy 
attribute-based encryption (KPABE) scheme [2] consists of 
the algorithms (ABESetup,ABEKeyGen,ABEEnc,ABEDec). 
The key generation center (KGC) executes ABESetup(1k)
to output public parameters par and master secret key 
msk. A user U with access structure P ∈ Q queries KGC , 
E-mail address: alfredo.rial@uni.lu.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipl.2019.02.010
0020-0190/© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.which runs ABEKeyGen(msk,P) and returns secret key 
skP . On input message m and set of attributes A ∈ S, 
ABEEnc(par,m,A) computes ciphertext ct, which can only 
be decrypted by a user U that possesses an access struc-
ture P satisﬁed by A (ct implicitly contains A). On input 
ciphertext ct and secret key skP , ABEDec outputs message 
m if A satisﬁes P.
3. Conditional access system by Yeh and Huang
The scheme proposed in [1] consists of an initializa-
tion phase, a subscriber registration phase, a rights man-
agement phase, and a subscriber revocation phase. (We 
note that the key stream and traﬃc encryption layers re-
main unchanged with respect to the DVB-H standard.) The 
scheme in [1] is based on the KPABE scheme in [2] and 
adds to it support for revocation. In the following descrip-
tion, we use boxes to highlight those elements that are 
added to the scheme in [2] in order to support revoca-
tion.
Initialization phase. The rights issuer (RI) executes the setup 
algorithm of the KPABE scheme to get the public param-
eters and the master secret key. Let S be the set of all 
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Algorithm ABESetup(1k) works as follows.
1. Run (p, G,Gt , e, g) ← G(1k).
2. Pick random y ← Zp .
3. For all j ∈ S, pick random t j ← Zp and compute T j ←
gt j .
4. Pick random τ ← Zp and compute W ← gτ .
5. Pick random ϒ ← Zp .
6. For i = 1 to N , pick ci ,di ← Zp and set hi,0 ← gci and hi,1 ← gdi .
7. Set the parameters
par ← (p, G, Gt , e, g, {T j} j∈S ,W , {hi,0,hi,1}Ni=1 ).1
8. Set the master secret key
msk ← (y, {t j} j∈S , τ ,ϒ, {hi,0,hi,1}Ni=1 ).2
9. Output the master secret key msk and the public pa-
rameters par.
The elements (y, {t j} j∈S) in the master secret key and the 
elements (p,G,Gt , e, g, {T j} j∈S) in the public parameters 
are those of Goyal et al.’s KPABE scheme [2]. The remaining 
elements are added by Yeh and Huang in order to support 
revocation.
Subscriber registration phase. A subscriber possesses a set 
of attributes or characteristics, such as age and subscrip-
tion category. Given those attributes, RI constructs an ac-
cess structure P. Then RI runs the key generation algo-
rithm of the KPABE scheme on input P in order to com-
pute a key that allows the subscriber to obtain all the 
right objects (RO) that match her age and subscription 
category. Algorithm ABEKeyGen also receives as input an 
n-bit revocation number Xn−1Xn−2 · · · X0, which must be 
unique for each subscriber. ABEKeyGen(msk,P) works as 
follows.
1. Pick random  ← Zp and compute WD ← g(y−)/τ .
2. For each node x in the tree T that deﬁnes P, choose 
a polynomial qx of degree dx = kx − 1, where kx is 
the threshold value of x. Polynomials qx are cho-
sen in a top-down manner, starting from the root 
node R . Set qR(0) = . (In Goyal et al., qR(0) = y. 
In Yeh and Huang, an additional element WD is in-
cluded in the key, which depends on both y and . 
WD is the key element that is updated when a sub-
scriber is revoked.) Choose other dR points randomly 
to deﬁne qR completely. For any other node x, set 
qx(0) ← qparent(x)(index(x)) and choose other dx points 
randomly to deﬁne qx completely.
3. Let Y be the set of leaf nodes in T . Compute {D j ←
gq j(0)/ti } j∈Y .
1 We note that the scheme by Goyal et al. [2] includes an element 
e(g, g)y in the public parameters. This element is not included in the 
public parameters in Yeh and Huang [1] because the rights issuer is the 
only party that needs to compute ciphertexts and the rights issuer has 
knowledge of the master secret key, which includes y.
2 In Yeh and Huang [1], ϒ is included neither in msk nor in par.4. Choose a value q1(0).
5. For i ∈ [0,N − 1], DRi ← g(q1(0)ϒ)/ci if Xi = 0 else DRi ← g(q1(0)ϒ)/di .
6. Set the secret key as
skP ← ({D j} j∈Y ,WD, {DRi}N−1i=0 ,q1(0)−1 ).3
The elements {D j} j∈Y are those of the secret key in the 
scheme by Goyal et al. [2]. The elements (WD, {DRi}N−1i=0 ,
q1(0)−1) are added by Yeh and Huang in order to support 
revocation.
Rights management phase. RI creates a right object (RO) 
that consists of the service encryption key (SEK), a set 
of attributes A, and related parameters, such as a time 
stamp. RI encrypts the right object RO by running the 
encryption algorithm of the KPABE scheme on input A. 
ABEEnc(par, RO , A) works as follows.
1. Pick random r ← Zp , compute E ′ ← RO  · (g, g)yr
(here, y is taken from the master secret key) and, for 
all j ∈A, compute E j ← T rj .
2. Compute gr .
3. Set the ciphertext ct ← (A, {E j} j∈A, E ′, gr ).
The elements (A, {E j} j∈A, E ′) form the ciphertext in the 
scheme by Goyal et al. [2]. The value gr is included by Yeh 
and Huang [1] in order to allow decrypting the message 
along with the new value WD in the secret key.
RI broadcasts the ciphertext to the subscribers. A sub-
scriber decrypts the ciphertext by using the decryption 
algorithm ABEDec(par, ct, skP). If the policy P associated 
with skP is satisﬁed by the set of attributes A in ct, 
ABEDec ﬁrst computes A = e(g, g)r and ﬁnally outputs 
RO  = E ′/(e(WD, Wr)A). The decryption algorithm in Yeh 
and Huang follows that of Goyal et al. The only differ-
ence is the last equation RO  = E ′/(e(WD, Wr)A), which 
includes the additional pairing operation e(WD, Wr).
Subscriber revocation phase. The following revocation mech-
anism is proposed by Yeh and Huang [1]. To revoke the 
subscriber with revocation number Xn−1Xn−2 · · · X0, RI and 
the subscribers execute a protocol by means of which R I
updates the value y in the master secret key, while the 
non-revoked subscribers update the value WD in their 
respective secret keys. First, R I executes the following 
steps.
1. Pick y′ ← Zp , compute y ← y′ − y and W ′ ←
gy/τ .4
3 We note that the value q1(0) is unnecessary. One can simply compute 
DRi ← gϒ/ci , if Xi = 0, or DRi ← gϒ/di , if Xi = 1.
4 We note that [1] says “generate the new public parameter W ′ ←
gy/τ to replace W”. This is a mistake. If W ′ replaces W in the public 
parameters and in the computation of ciphertexts, decryption does not 
work anymore. Furthermore, W ′ is a value that should not be revealed 
to the revoked subscriber. Consequently, W ′ should not become part of 
the public parameters because otherwise the revoked subscriber can learn 
it.
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for i = 0 to N − 1, compute REi ← hri, X¯i , where X¯i ←
1 − Xi .
3. Set a ciphertext ct ← ( X¯n−1 X¯n−2 · · · X¯0, RE ′, {REi}N−1i=0 ).
RI broadcasts the ciphertext ct to the subscribers. As 
can be seen, only the revoked subscriber is unable to 
decrypt the ciphertext. The reason is that the revoked 
subscriber has a secret key for the revocation number 
Xn−1Xn−2 · · · X0 and none of the bits in Xn−1Xn−2 · · · X0
matches a bit in X¯n−1 X¯n−2 · · · X¯0. However, because re-
vocation numbers are unique for each subscribers, for 
the non-revoked subscribers there is at least one bit that 
matches. A non-revoked subscriber decrypts the cipher-
text as follows. First, ﬁnd a bit Xi such that Xi = X¯i and 
take the element DRi of the secret key. Then compute 
W ′ ← RE ′/e(DRi, q1(0)−1REi). After retrieving W ′ , a non-
revoked subscriber computes WD′ ← WD · W ′ = g(y′−)/τ
to update her secret key.
4. Discussion of the CAS proposed by Yeh and Huang
Collusion-resistance. Yeh and Huang deﬁne collusion-resis-
tance as follows: “A subscriber cannot cooperate with 
other subscribers to promote his own privileges.” This ba-
sically means that two or more colluding subscribers that 
hold secret keys for the KPABE scheme should not be able 
to decrypt any ciphertext that any of them is not able to 
decrypt on their own. I.e., the colluding subscribers are 
not able to combine their secret keys in such a way that 
they are able to decrypt ciphertexts that none of them can 
decrypt individually. The KPABE scheme in [2] is collusion-
resistant.
However, we show that the KPABE with revocation 
scheme proposed by Yeh and Huang in [1] is vulnerable 
to collusion attacks. In the revocation method in [1], the 
rights issuer RI produces key update material that is broad-
cast to all the non-revoked subscribers. The scheme in [1]
effectively prevents the revoked subscriber from retrieving 
key update material. However, it does not ensure that a re-
voked subscriber and a non-revoked one cannot collude to 
decrypt ciphertexts that they are not able to decrypt on 
their own.
Let us show this through an example with two sub-
scribers S1 and S2 and three subscriber attributes or cat-
egories c1, c2 and c3. S1 (resp. S2) possesses a secret key 
that allows her to obtain right objects RO for category c1
(resp. c2). Collusion-resistance of the KPABE scheme in [2]
ensures that, if S1 and S2 collude, they are able to obtain 
right objects for categories c1 and c2 because they are able 
to do that without colluding, but they are not able to ob-
tain right objects for category c3. At some point, subscriber 
S2 is revoked by the rights issuer. After revocation, S1 up-
dates her key and is still able to obtain right objects for 
category c1. S2 is not able to update her key and is unable 
to decrypt anything. However, if S1 and S2 collude, S1 can 
give S2 the key update material, and then they can obtain 
again right objects for category c2. This violates collusion-
resistance because, after S2 is revoked, neither S1 nor S2
are able to obtain right objects for category c2 on their own. The ﬁgure below describes the attack in the sub-
scriber revocation phase.
• RI broadcasts the ciphertext ct ← ( X¯n−1 X¯n−2 · · · X¯0,
RE ′, {REi}N−1i=0 ).• A non-revoked subscriber S1 computes W ′ ← RE ′/
e(DRi, q1(0)−1REi) by using DRi for i such that Xi =
X¯i .
• S1 sends W ′ to a revoked subscriber S2 with whom 
S1 colludes.
• S2 computes WD′ ← WD · W ′ = g(y′−)/τ to update 
her secret key. Thanks to that, S2 can decrypt as if 
S2 was not revoked.
To illustrate that this is a serious security ﬂaw, let 
us point out that a trivial (albeit ineﬃcient) revocation 
method does not suffer from this problem. Consider a 
trivial revocation method where, when a subscriber is re-
voked, the rights issuer runs again the setup algorithm of 
the KPABE scheme to compute new public parameters and 
a new master secret key, and uses this master secret key 
to compute new secret keys for all the non-revoked sub-
scribers. As can be seen, with this revocation method, after 
S2 is revoked, S1 and S2 are not able to obtain right ob-
jects for category c2. The reason is that the old secret key 
of S2 is now useless because the parameters of the KPABE
scheme have changed. In conclusion, the CAS proposed by 
Yeh and Huang is not collusion-resistant.
Non-repudiation. Yeh and Huang deﬁne non-repudiation as 
follows: “To ensure video content validity and quality, the 
video server should not deny that the video contents are 
delivered from it.” Non-repudiation basically implies that 
the integrity and origin of received data can be veriﬁed 
and that the sender of the data cannot deny being the orig-
inator.
Yeh and Huang claim that their CAS provides non-
repudiation. Their argument basically states that, because 
RI is the only party that knows the values (y, ϒ) in the 
master secret key, RI is the only party able to compute 
valid ciphertexts that encrypt right objects and valid ci-
phertexts that encrypt key update material. Consequently, 
Yeh and Huang conclude that, if a subscriber possesses a 
valid ciphertext, then RI is not able to deny that he com-
puted and sent that ciphertext.
As can be seen, this argument is not valid. First, 
an adversary eavesdropping the network can get a ci-
phertext sent by RI, and forward it to subscribers at a 
later stage. Moreover, the adversary can modify the en-
crypted message before forwarding the ciphertext. For 
example, if the adversary wishes to modify a ciphertext 
ct ← (A, {E j} j∈A, E ′, gr) (where E ′ ← RO  · (g, g)yr ) that 
encrypts RO to a ciphertext that encrypts RO  · M ′ , the 
adversary simply replaces E ′ by E ′ · M . An adversarial 
subscriber can also modify the message encrypted in a 
ciphertext received from RI by using the same technique. 
Therefore, RI is able to deny that he computed a given 
valid ciphertext. In conclusion, the CAS of Yeh and Huang 
does not provide non-repudiation. The ﬁgure below de-
scribes the attack in the rights management phase.
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{E j} j∈A, E ′, gr ), where E ′ ← RO  · (g, g)yr is com-
puted on input an incorrect RO.
• An honest subscriber S decrypts the ciphertext and 
obtains the incorrect RO. S accuses RI of sending a 
ciphertext ct that encrypts an incorrect RO.
• R I claims ct was modiﬁed by an adversary that set 
E ′ ← E ′ · M for some M .
• S is unable to prove that R I indeed sent ct.
Direct revocation vs indirect revocation. There are two revoca-
tion methods for attribute-based encryption: direct [3] and 
indirect [4]. In an indirect revocation method, the key gen-
eration center, i.e., the trusted party that keeps the master 
secret key and computes keys for users, computes and 
publishes key update material so that only non-revoked 
users can update their keys. The advantage of indirect re-
vocation is that the senders, i.e., the parties that compute 
ciphertexts, do not need to know the revocation list. The 
disadvantage of the indirect revocation method is that all 
the non-revoked users need to update their keys.
In a direct revocation method, senders compute cipher-
texts that revoked users are not able to decrypt. In order to 
do that, senders need to know the revocation list, but key 
updates are not required. In many applications, senders do 
not know the revocation list, and thus only indirect revo-
cation can be applied. However, in CAS, the only sender is 
the rights issuer, and the rights issuer knows the revoca-
tion list. Therefore, in CAS, direct revocation methods can 
be applied and then key updates are not needed.
The CAS proposed by Yeh and Huang uses an indi-
rect revocation method where non-revoked users need to 
update their keys. We note that direct revocation meth-
ods avoid the need of updating keys. For instance, in a 
CAS that uses identity-based broadcast encryption [5] or 
attribute-based broadcast encryption [3], ciphertexts that 
encrypt the right object are computed on input the list of 
subscribers. When a subscriber is revoked, the rights is-
suer simply removes the subscriber from the list. Thanks 
to that, revoked subscribers are not able to decrypt the ci-
phertext and obtain the RO.
User-based vs attribute-based access control. Attribute-based 
access control allows a party to describe an access con-
trol policy that deﬁnes the attributes that a user must 
possess in order to be granted access to a service or re-
source. In settings where the party aiming at controlling 
access to the service does not know the identities or the 
attributes of the users that may attempt to gain access to 
it, attribute-based encryption is adequate for implement-
ing attribute-based access control.
However, in a CAS for pay-TV, RI usually knows the 
identities and the attributes of all the parties that may 
want to access TV broadcasts because those parties must 
subscribe and pay a fee. (Although it would be possible to design a CAS scheme that tries to provide user anonymity 
by using anonymous payment methods and anonymous 
communication networks, this is not done in practice for 
eﬃciency and usability reasons.) In the CAS by Yeh and 
Huang, RI learns the identities and the attributes of the 
subscribers during the subscriber registration phase. The 
identity is learnt to assign a unique revocation number. 
The attributes are learnt to compute the secret key for the 
subscriber.
Therefore, because RI knows the identities and the at-
tributes of the subscribers, RI can decide whether a sub-
scriber is entitled to obtain a given RO by simply checking 
himself whether the subscriber’s attributes fulﬁll the ac-
cess control policy for that RO. This allows RI to replace 
attribute-based encryption by an encryption scheme for 
user-based access control, which can be instantiated more 
eﬃciently. In user-based access control, the party that con-
trols access to a service simply makes a list of all the users 
that must be granted access. In CAS, for each right object 
(RO), RI can make a list of the identities of the subscribers 
that are entitled to obtain that RO.
In a CAS that uses identity-based broadcast encryption 
(IBBE), for each RO, RI makes a list of subscribers that are 
allowed to obtain it. Remarkably, the attribute-based ac-
cess control functionality is enhanced, because, while in 
the CAS proposed by Yeh and Huang the class of access 
control policies that can be applied is restricted to those 
supported by the KPABE scheme used as building block, 
now RI can apply any access control policy on the sub-
scriber’s attributes.
In comparison to attribute-based access control, user-
based access control allows more eﬃcient implemen-
tations. In fact, IBBE can be realized more eﬃciently 
than ABE. Therefore, for the sake of eﬃciency, encryp-
tion schemes for user-based access control are preferable 
whenever they can be used, i.e., when the party in charge 
of controlling access to a service knows the identities and 
the attributes of all the users of the service.
References
[1] L.-Y. Yeh, J.-L. Huang, A conditional access system with eﬃcient key 
distribution and revocation for mobile pay-TV systems, ACM Trans. 
Multimed. Comput. Commun. Appl. (TOMCCAP) 9 (3) (2013) 18.
[2] V. Goyal, O. Pandey, A. Sahai, B. Waters, Attribute-based encryption 
for ﬁne-grained access control of encrypted data, in: Proceedings of 
the 13th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 
ACM, 2006, pp. 89–98.
[3] N. Attrapadung, H. Imai, Conjunctive broadcast and attribute-based 
encryption, in: Pairing-Based Cryptography–Pairing 2009, Springer, 
2009, pp. 248–265.
[4] A. Boldyreva, V. Goyal, V. Kumar, Identity-based encryption with ef-
ﬁcient revocation, in: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on 
Computer and Communications Security, 2008, pp. 417–426.
[5] C. Delerablée, Identity-based broadcast encryption with constant size 
ciphertexts and private keys, in: International Conference on the The-
ory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Springer, 
2007, pp. 200–215.
